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ESSAY
FACES IN THE COURTROOMt
STEWART DALZELLtt
A few months after I began my work on the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, I attended a week of
seminars in Washington, D.C., sponsored by the Federal Judicial Cen-
ter. Besides covering many aspects of federal civil and criminal law,
we had dinner each night with judicial luminaries, including one
night at the Supreme Court dining with Justices White and Scalia.
The host of our last such dinner was one of the nation's brightest
court of appeals judges, who ate with us in a private dining room at a
pleasant restaurant. He regaled us with his experience on his circuit.
t This Essay is adapted from remarks given at the University of Penn.ylvania Law
Review Annual Banquet at Philadelphia's City Hall on April 3, 1998.
-- United States DistrictJudge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. B.S. 1965,
J.D. 1969, University of Pennsylvania. I am grateful (again) for the always prompt and
reliable help ofJudith F. Ambler and her able staff at the William H. Hastie Library of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
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Of all his good stories, however, one has stayed with me that I would
like briefly to share here.
The judge described a case involving a state university's applica-
tion of NCAA eligibility rules to exclude a gifted young athlete from
his chosen game. When the young man was foreclosed from playing
his sport in intercollegiate competition, he filed an action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. As the judge was canvassing for us the interesting legal
points at issue, he mentioned something in passing that, for me,
eclipsed his erudite, witty account. He mentioned that during the
oral argument he had noticed a young male face in the packed court-
room. The judge had wondered, to himself, "Is that young fellow
there our plaintiff?"
I suddenly felt saddened for this fine judge. I thought, you could
not recognize--or even picture in your mind-this disappointed star
who brought these stimulating issues before you? He had no face for
you? There, I thought, is a pity.
This Essay is about avoiding that pity. I offer here one judge's
view about judging, and, in particular, about a consequence of realiz-
ing that in every case there is at least one face, and usually more, who
not only looks at what we judges do, but is profoundly and personally
affected by our actions.
Although most speakers of American English use the word
"passion" to refer to "amorous feelings or desires," that meaning is, in
fact, the eighth of ten major definitions of the word in the 1989 edi-
tion of the Oxford English Dictionary.' The very first definition in the
Oxford English Dictionary, "[t] he suffering of pain,"2 applies to litigants,
as in "the passion of Sacco and Vanzetti." This application of
"passion" does no more than recognize that the term "federal case" is
not a clich6 for our litigants. For all of them, their cases represent a
major crisis in their lives that they will never forget.
3
As we consider some faces here, I would like to apply another
meaning of "passion." The sixth Oxford English Dictionary definition is
"[a] ny kind of feeling by which the mind is powerfully affected or
111 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICrIoNARY 309-10 (2d ed. 1989).
2 Id. at 309 (definition 1).
3 Those of a philological bent will find definitions of "passion" other than the
common American one, and these meanings, too, describe many of the cases that are
filed in our Court. See id. (definition 5a) ("The fact or condition of being acted upon
or affected by external agency."); id. (definition 10a) ("[A]n overmastering zeal or en-
thusiasm for a special project; a ... vehement predilection .... to .... an aim or ob-
ject pursued with zeal.").
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moved."4 I here will argue that this meaning of "passion" has rele-
vance to the business of the judiciary.
An example of how it is relevant may be found in the cele-
brated-and in its early years, condemned-action of my brother
judge, Raymond J. Broderick, in the famous case of Halderman v.
Pennhurst State School & HospitaL5 Haldeman was Judge Broderick's
landmark case that dealt with the constitutional and statutory rights
of mentally retarded people. The first of seventy class-action civil-
rights lawsuits filed around the country, Halderman has for over two
decades served as a model for deinstitutionalization litigation in
America.
Judge Broderick issued dozens of published opinions, the court
of appeals published its share, and the Supreme Court twice weighed
in.6 Indeed, from the Supreme Court's second decision in 1984 until
today, Judge Broderick has issued no less than twenty-four published
opinions, and has entered hundreds of orders implementing his
original injunction.
On February 9 of this year, Judge Broderick issued a forty-one
page memorandum that, at last, looks to the end of the litigation that
began on May 30, 1974.7 Indeed, Judge Broderick's February 9 deci-
sion contemplates a terminal date ofJune 30, 1998.
In his canvass in this opinion of the "empirical evidence that class
members are better off in almost every way since leaving Pennhurst
and receiving individualized habilitation in the community,"8 Judge
Broderick offers a vignette that, I submit, tellingly reveals the passion
Id. (definition 6a).
' No. CIV. A.74-1345 (E.D. Pa. filed May 30, 1974).
6 See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (listing findings of fact and conclusions of law after a 32-day trial), aFfid in part
and rev'd in par4 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc) (affirming on statutory grounds
but reversing as to the scope of injunctive relief granted and avoiding constitutional
claims), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (reversing the Third Circuit and remanding for con-
sideration of state statutory and federal constitutional issues Judge Broderick de-
cided). On remand, the Third Circuit affirmed its prior decision, this time on state
statutory grounds, see 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc) (reissuing prior en banc
decision), rev'd, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (5-4 decision) (reversing, on Eleventh Amendment
grounds, the grant of prospective injunctive relief against state officials on the basis of
state-law violations). In 1985, a class-action settlement and consent decree was ap-
proved, see 610 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. Pa. 1985), and in 1994, a contempt order was is-
sued against the defendants for violation of the consent decree, see 154 F.R.D. 594
(E.D. Pa. 1994).
Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., No. CIV. A.74-1345, 1998 WL 57502
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 1998).
8 Id. at *11.
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that accumulated in him after thirty-two days of testimony in the 1977
trial. At page twenty-seven of his February 9 Memorandum, Judge
Broderick writes about the lead plaintiff as she was in 1977 and is
now:
"Terri Lee Halderman, the original plaintiff in this action, was admitted
to Pennhurst in 1966 when she was twelve years of age. During her
eleven years at Pennhurst, as a result of attacks and accidents, she has
lost several teeth and suffered a fractured jaw, fractured fingers, a frac-
tured toe and numerous lacerations, cuts, scratches and bites." Today,
the Court can happily report that Ms. Halderman lives in a one-level,
ranch-style home with two roommates in Delaware County. Her home
has a deck and a backyard where she enjoys the outdoors. She is in
good health. She is provided with one-to-one staffing at all times, which
enables her to participate in activities in the community 
during the day.
9
It is quite evident that twenty years after her testimony, Judge
Broderick has never forgotten the face of Terri Lee Halderman. Of
course, he made legal history along the way, but query whether any
judge, including Judge Broderick, would have invested the energy,
patience, intelligence, and creativity that Judge Broderick has
brought to bear for almost a quarter of a century without the passion
Terri Lee Halderman animated in this insightful judge.
Compare Judge Broderick's view of Terri Lee Halderman with a
similar litigant before Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and his breth-
ren in 1927. In case the reader has forgotten who Carrie Buck was,
here is Justice Holmes's complete description of her:
Carrie Buck is a feebleminded white woman who was committed to the
State Colony [for Epileptics and Feeble Minded for the State of Vir-
ginia] in due form. She is the daughter of a feebleminded mother in
the same institution, and the mother of an illegitimate feebleminded
child. She was eighteen years old at the time of the trial 
of hercase ....10
When Ms. Buck's guardian and next friend, R.G. Shelton, took
due process and equal protection exception to State Colony superin-
tendent J.H. Bell's intention to sterilize Carrie Buck, Justice Holmes
and seven of his brethren (justice Butler dissented) ruled against her.
Justice Holmes likened the involuntary cutting of Carrie Buck's fallo-
pian tubes to the compulsory vaccination of adults during a smallpox
epidemic." He also observed that "[ilt would be strange" if the
9 Id. at *12 (quoting Halderman, 446 F. Supp. at 1309).
'0 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927).
" See id. at 207 (citingJacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)). It is per-
haps not surprising thatJacobson readily came to Holmes's mind. The case involved
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Commonwealth of Virginia "could not call upon those who already
sap the strength of the State" for a "lesser sacrifice" than military serv-
ice sometimes required of those who did not sap that sovereign
strength. And then the learned Justice almost invited Ms. Buck to
thank him for her forced sterilization when he wrote: "It is better for
all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for
crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent
those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.',12 Thus, as
the night follows the day, Holmes held for the Court, "Three genera-
tions of imbeciles are enough." 3 That's all. There, you have it.
Who would dare quibble with ChiefJudge Posner's appraisal that
places Holmes equal to, and possibly even greater than, ChiefJustice
John Marshall in the judicial pantheon? 4 For Learned Hand, whom
Chief Judge Posner ranks just behind Holmes and Marshall, "Holmes
was," Professor Gunther reports to us, "an unblemished idol on the
bench."'5 Fifty years after Buck v. Bell, I am sure thatJudge Broderick,
review of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts's decision upholding a 1902
regulation of the Cambridge, Massachusetts, Board of Health requiring all adults not
vaccinated since March 1, 1897, to get free smallpox inoculations at a time when
"smallpox... was prevalent to some extent in the city of Cambridge and the disease
was increasing." Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27. HenningJacobson refused to be vaccinated,
apparently based upon his and his son's "great and extreme suffering" after similar
vaccinations. Commonwealth v. Pear, 66 N.E. 719 (Mass. 1903) (same case). Far from
what happened to Carrie Buck, Chief Justice Knowlton stressed that the Cambridge
Board of Health did not have it "in their power to vaccinate him by force, and the
worst that could happen to him under the [enabling) statute would be the payment of
the penalty of $5." Id. at 722. The United States Supreme Court report suggests that
Mr.Jacobson preferredjail to the payment of the fine. SeeJacobson, 197 U.S. at 14.
12 Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
's Id.
In his review of Gerald Gunther's 1994 biography of Learned Hand, ChiefJudge
Posner may, in fact, by deft phrasemaking place Holmes at the apex: "Learned Hand
is considered by many the third-greatestjudge in the history of the United States, after
Holmes and John Marshall." Richard A. Posner, The Learned Hand Biography and the
Question of Judicial Greatness, 104 YALE L.J. 511, 511 (1994) (reviewing GERALD
GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND (1994)).
Evidence that ChiefJudge Posner is a faithful acolyte at the Holmes altar may be
seen in his editing of a book of Holmes pearls. See THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES (Richard
A. Posner ed., 1992). In that collection, Chief Judge Posner unequivocally describes
Holmes as "the most illustrious figure in the history of American law," Richard A. Pos-
ner, Introduction to id. at ix, and also engages in a rather labored, and somewhat dis-
quieting, defense of Buck See id. at xxvii-xxix ("We may find Holmes's eugenic
enthusiasms shocking, although with the renewed interest (stimulated by modern
medicine's ability to keep people alive in a vegetative state) in euthanasia, and with
the rise of genetic engineering, we may yet find those enthusiasms prescient rather
than depraved.").
'5 GUNTHER, supra note 14, at 345.
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when he decided in favor of Terri Lee Halderman, would not have
allowed his name to be mentioned in the same breath with the great
Justice Holmes.
I am equally sure, however, that, if given the choice, Terri Lee
Halderman would not trade places with Carrie Buck-even to be
before the demigod Holmes-for all the attorney's fees ever awarded
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Justice Holmes might retort, "Well, what
would you expect an imbecile to choose?" But would any serious per-
son attribute her choice to feeble-mindedness? Or would Ms.
Halderman's choice be an intelligent one because, just possibly,
Judge Broderick discerned something in her that Justice Holmes was
blind to in Carrie Buck?
The answer to this question really is not complicated. WhatJudge
Broderick saw in Terri Lee Halderman, and what Justice Holmes did
not see in Carrie Buck, was that she is a human being, with a human
face.' 6
" Although Justice Holmes was pleased to consign Carrie Buck to the eugenical
scrap heap, she lived to prove the great Justice wrong. Professor Paul A. Lombardo
reports about what happened to Ms. Buck and her daughter, Vivian:
After Carrie left the Colony [in 1927], she married and became a member
of the Methodist Church in Bland where she sang in the choir as she had as a
teenager in Charlottesville. After twenty-four years of marriage, her husband
died and she traveled to Front Royal, Virginia, where she met and later mar-
ried Charles Detamore. He took work in farms and orchards and Carrie as-
sisted a local family in caring for an elderly relative.
Throughout Carrie's adult life she regularly displayed intelligence and
kindness that belied the "feeblemindedness" and "immorality" that were used
as an excuse to sterilize her. She was an avid reader, and even in her last
weeks was able to converse lucidly, recalling events from her childhood.
Branded by Holmes as a second generation imbecile, Carrie provided no sup-
port for his glib epithet throughout her life.
Carrie's daughter Vivian, like her mother, was wrongly accused. On the
basis of a nurse's comment that she was "not quite normal," Vivian Buck was
used to prove her mother's hereditary "defects." Although she lived barely
eight years, she too disproved Holmes's epigram. In her two years of school-
ing, she performed quite well, at one point earning a spot on the school
"Honor Roll."
Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 30, 60-61 (1985) (footnote omitted) (citing testimony of Nurse Caroline
Wilhelm and Vivian's record at the Venable School in Charlottesville, Virginia).
Carrie Buck's fifth-grade teacher commented that she was "very good-deportment
and lessons," and recommended her for promotion to the sixth grade. Id. at 52 &
n.123.
Lombardo also demonstrates in his definitive article that Buck v. Bellwas a collusive
suit orchestrated by three eugenics enthusiasts, one of them being Carrie Buck's
counsel, Irving Whitehead. "Whitehead called no witnesses to dispute the specific al-
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It may be objected that this is all quite unfair, because Judge
Broderick is a trial judge and Justice Holmes was an appellate judge.
Appellate judges see lawyers, not parties. There are two responses to
this reasonable objection, one general, one relating to Holmes in par-
ticular.
The first response is that, just as seeing is not always perceiving, so
perceiving does not always depend upon seeing. A case involving a
litigant from another disfavored group will illuminate this point.
Justice Potter Stewvart in 1961 got the picture from advocate
Henry W. Sawyer, III, of a young man named Bernhard Deutch.
Deutch was convicted in 1956 of four counts of criminal contempt of
Congress for not answering four questions the House Committee on
Un-American Activities put to him. 7 Bernhard Deutch was a physics
wunderkind from Brooklyn who at sixteen went to Cornell. While
there, he met a charismatic black law student named Ross
Richardson, who eventually persuaded Deutch to join a small Com-
munist Party cell. Richardson would drive Deutch to the meetings
and collect dues from him.
Deutch's participation was always half-hearted, and so he told
Richardson he wanted to resign his Party membership. Richardson
retorted that Deutch's real reason was that Deutch was a "white chau-
vinist" who could not stand having a black in control. Deutch re-
lented and remained in the Party until he came to the University of
Pennsylvania for his doctoral work.
As Justice Stewvart noted, Richardson had joined the Party "at the
behest of the Federal Bureau of Investigation."', District Judge Alex-
ander Holtzoff neglected to mention this resonant fact in his bench-
trial findings, which throughout their Holmes-like brevity regarded
Deutch as a stick figure.'9 By contrast, it is apparent from the per-
legations against Carrie... [and] Whitehead's cross-examination of the witnesses for
the State was so weak that it was often unclear which side he was representing." Id. at
51. Whitehead "represented" Carrie Buck through proceedings in the Supreme
Court.
7 See Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961). Deutch was sentenced to 90
days "in a common jail" and a fine of $100 for violation of 2 U.S.C. § 192. See Brief for
Petitioner at 8 (No. 233).
1 Deutch, 367 U.S. at 460 n.4.
' See United States v. Deutch, 147 F. Supp. 89 (D.D.C. 1956), aff'd, 280 F.2d 691
(D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'd, 367 U.S. 456 (1961). Surprisingly, in view of this being a bench
trial, Judge Holtzoff never mentioned Deutch's name, but instead merely referred to
him as "the defendant." The Court of Appeals at least mentioned Deutch's name, as
well as his age at the time of the Committee's inquiry, and where he was a student. See
Deutch v. United States, 280 F.2d 691, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1960), rev', 367 U.S. 456 (1961).
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sonal details in Justice Stewart's opinion that he perceived the face of
a young man abused by his government, and not just "a Communist,"
as Carrie Buck was for Justice Holmes just "an imbecile." It was this
perception of Deutch as Kafkaesque victim, I submit, that led Justice
Stewart to supply the fifth vote for reversing young Deutch's convic-
tion 20 over four dissenters, including Holmes-worshiper Justice Frank-
furter.2' Thus, Deutch teaches that appellate judges can perceive faces
that even the best districtjudges do not see.
With cryptic economy worthy of the Holmes who gave us Buck, Judge Holtzoff repeat-
edly held, without any elaboration, that each unanswered Committee question "was
pertinent on its face." See, e.g., Deutch, 147 F. Supp. at 92 (count two).
It being almost 30 years since his death, some may have forgotten, if they ever
knew, what a distinguished figure Judge Holtzoff was in American law. In 1950, for
example, with William W. Barron, Judge Holtzoff wrote the treatise, Federal Practice and
Procedure As Professor Charles Alan Wright acknowledges, our present "Wright &
Miller" is the "lineal descendant" of that treatise. 1 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE at vii (2d ed. 1982). The Supreme Court regarded Judge
Holtzoff as "the person who almost certainly drafted" what became the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1994). Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 855-
56 (1984).
20 Justice Stewart was anything but an automatic vote against the government in
this line of cases. Only two years before Deutch, he supplied the fifth vote-and joined
the four Deutch dissenters-in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959), argued
just a month after Justice Stewart joined the Court. The majority upheld, over First
Amendment objections, the power of a subcommittee of the House Committee on
Un-American Activities to inquire into a witness's past or present membership in the
Communist Party. See Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 125-34. Justice Black wrote a powerful
dissent, in which ChiefJustice Warren and Justice Douglas joined, against the major-
ity's "conclusion that, on balance, the interest of the Government in stifling these
freedoms [of speech, press, assembly, and petition] is greater than the interest of the
people in having them exercised," id. at 143 (Black, J., dissenting); while stating his
.complete agreement" with Justice Black, Justice Brennan filed a brief, separate dis-
sent, see id. at 166 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The high constitutional stakes in Baren-
blatt did not escapeJustice Black's attention. SeeROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK 489-
91 (1994) (discussing Black's Barenblatt dissent).
Although this history and the texts of Justice Stewart's and Judge Holtzoff's opin-
ions support the analysis I have offered here, the account of the oral argument from
Deutch's lawyer, Henry W. Sawyer, III, leaves no doubt that Deutch's face was decisive
for Justice Stewart. After advocate Sawyer recited the facts set out in the text, he re-
ports thatJustice Stewart "leaned forward and said, 'Is that in the record, Mr. Sawyer?'
I said indeed it was .... " On hearing this, Justice Stewart sat back and said to a col-
league (probably Justice Brennan), "'Outrageous... outrageous!'" in a volume "more
voce than sotto." Letter from Henry W. Sawyer, III to the author 2-3 (Mar. 2, 1998) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Sawyer].
21 Justice Frankfurter joined the dissent ofJustice Harlan, who wrote the Barenblatt
majority opinion. Justice Whittaker wrote a separate dissent in which Justice Clark
joined. In his compilation of Holmes-adoring essays, see MR. JUSTICE HOLMES (Felix
Frankfurter ed., 1931), then-Professor Frankfurter wrote that Holmes "is led by the
divination of the philosopher and the imagination of the poet. He is, indeed, phi-
losopher become king." Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Constitution: A
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My second response is that, although it is likely that Justice
Holmes had the same problem my circuit court judge had with his
disappointed NCAA superstar, there is little reason to suppose that
Holmes even cast his eyes into the well of the courtroom that April
twenty-second in 1927. We know from his correspondence with
Harold Laski that Holmes did not torture himself over Carrie Buck's
plight. Three days after the case was argued, Holmes reported to his
English friend that he got the assignment to write the Buck opinion
"Saturday evening" (the day after oral argument), and wrote it
"yesterday," (Sunday, April 24), so that it was "just sent ... to the
printer" on Monday, April 25.2
It should not surprise us that Justice Holmes never pictured Car-
rie Buck's face. It was, after all, with Olympian detachment that
Holmes wrote to Harold Laski, only seven -years before Buck, "I always
say.., that if my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help them.
It's myjob."23 Ah, what fools these mortals be! clucks Holmes from
24on high.
Review of His Twenty-Five Years on the Supreme Court, in MR. JUsTIcE HOLMEs, supra, at 46,
54.
Advocate Sawyer reports that at the Deutch oral argument, his contentions "so an-
noyed"Justice Frankfurter "that after a colloquy with me in which I all but asked him
to get off my back so I could address the rest of the [C]ourt, he turned his chair
around facing backward." Sawyer, supra note 20, at 2 n.****.
Letter from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to HaroldJ. Laski (Apr. 25, 1927) in
2 HoLMEs-LAsIu LETTERS 937, 937-38 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953). Fidelity to the
complete historical record requires mention that Holmes did change one word in the
draft he sent "to the printer" on April 25 for circulation to his brethren. In the "it is
better for all the world" sentence quoted in full in the text accompanying note 12 su-
pra, Holmes amended what was "kill degenerate offspring" in the final May 2 opinion.
See Mary L. Dudziak, Oliver Wendell Holmes as a Eugenic Reformer. Rhetoric in the Writing of
Constitutional Text, 71 IOWAL. REV. 833, 859 n.178 (1986).
Letter fromJustice Oliver Wendell Holmes to HaroldJ. Laski (Mar. 4, 1920), in
1 HOLMEs-LASKI LE'TERS, supra note 22, at 249, 249 (discussing Holmes's view that the
Sherman Act is a "foolish law" that the country nevertheless "likes").
24 This caricature tones down Professor Gilmore's more savage critique of Holmes
on this point
[T]he function of the law, as Holmes saw it, is simply to channel private ag-
gressions in an orderly, perhaps in a dignified, fashion. He reduced all ofju-
risprudence to a single, frightening statement:
The first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should corre-
spond with the actual feelings and demands of the community,
whether right or wrong.
That is, if the dominant majority ... desires to persecute blacks or Jews or
communists or atheists, the law, if it is to be "sound," must arrange for the
persecution to be carried out with, as we might say, due process.
GRANT GILiORE, THE AGES OFAMERICAN LAW 49-50 (1977) (quoting OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 36 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963)).
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Does this difference in these two judges make Judge Broderick
dangerous and Justice Holmes safe? Judge Bork, who worships
Holmes as the High Priest of Positivism, would certainly answer,
"Yes!" He likes the punch line Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant attributed
to Holmes: "I am not here to do justice. I am here to play the game
according to the rules."25 Judge Bork quotes this punch line because
it supports Bork's view of Holmes as a paragon of judicial restraint, 26 a
27
viewJustice Scalia apparently shares.
ChiefJustice Burger, too, would answer, "Yes!" In a concurrence
in Bifulco v. United States, the former ChiefJustice stood firmly on the
side of Holmes's judge-as-referee-of-the-game role: "Our duty, to
paraphrase Mr. Justice Holmes in a conversation with Judge Learned
Hand, is not to do justice but to apply the law and hope thatjustice is
done.
,28
At the risk of profaning the idol of Chief Justice Burger, Justice
Frankfurter, Chief Judge Hand, Chief Judge Posner, and probably a
majority of my fellow active Article III judges,2 I cannot resist point-
ing out that neither the United States Reports nor the Supreme Court Re-
porter account of Buck v. Bell shows any citation of any rule of any
game after that sentence about three generations of imbeciles being
"enough."3 0 And at the risk of desecrating the Holmes altar, may I
suggest that the only applicable rule in Buck comes from H.L.A.
Hart's game of "scorer's discretion," in which the "scorer" decides, in
his sole discretion, who has won the game?3' Can Buck possibly be a
law-bordered icon ofjudicial restraint?
2 Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant, Justice Touched with Fire, in MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, su-
pra note 21, at 183, 206. Sergeant begins her essay on Holmes with the sentence,
"Here is a Yankee, strayed from Olympus." Id. at 183.
26 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 6 (1990) (quoting from his dis-
sent from the denial of rehearing en banc in Hohri v. United States, 793 F.2d 304, 313
(D.C. Cir. 1986), rev'd, 482 U.S. 64 (1987)).
27 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1176-80 (1989) (extolling the virtues of a "general rule of law" over the "personal di-
rection to do justice," even within the "narrow context" of common-law lawmaking).
Appropriately enough, we are told that Scalia's essay was first delivered as the Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. Lecture at Harvard University on Valentine's Day, 1989. See id. at
1175 n.t.
447 U.S. 381, 402 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
While there is no difficulty finding many Holmes critics in the academy, see, e.g.,
Louise Weinberg, Holmes'Failure, 96 MICH. L. REV. 691 (1997), it is quite another mat-
ter to find them in the federal judiciary.
Indeed, in the entire opinion, Holmes cited only one case,Jacobson v. Massachu-
setts, cited and discussed supra note 11.
3' H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 142-44 (2d ed. 1994).
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Perhaps Buck and other cases in our history suggest that the real
danger exists when judges see abstractions instead of faces. Carrie
Buck, and others judicially disfavored in their time-such as Lloyd
Barenblatt, Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu, and Dred Scott and his wife
and daughters 3 2 -could certainly be forgiven for agreeing with this
suggestion.
On the other hand, does it risk a regime of idiosyncratic substan-
tive due process-or of that odious practice known as "judicial activ-
ism'"-to see Terri Lee Halderman and Carrie Buck as human beings
who powerfully affect or move the judicial mind within the meaning
of Oxford English Dictionary definition six of "passion"?
Please understand that I in no way intend by these remarks to de-
value the importance of reason and scholarship in the hard work of
judging at every level. I value scholarship precisely because every
party before the court deserves the critical thought and painstaking
efforts that are the hallmarks of the scholar's art. The fulcrum of
definition six of "passion" is, after all, "the mind."
Nor do I take a brief here for a judge to be, as Cardozo carica-
tured, "a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of
32 Compare the depiction of Lloyd Barenblatt by the majority in Barenblatt, dis-
cussed supra text accompanying note 20, with Justice Black's portrait in dissent, see
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134-35 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). The
person mentioned in Justice Harlan's majority opinion was always an unnamed
"petitioner," who was "an instructor in psychology at Vassar College from 1950 to
shortly before his appearance before the Subcommittee." Id. at 114. In his dissent,
Justice Black, among other details, pointed out that "[a]fter service of the
[Subcommittee] summons, but before Barenblatt appeared on June 28 [1954], his
four-year contract with Vassar expired and was not renewed. He, therefore, came to
the Committee as a private citizen without ajob." Id. at 134 (Black, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Black then demonstrated how the Committee's "pitiless publicity and exposure"
campaign inevitably cost Barenblatt and others their livelihoods. Id. at 156-60 (Black,
J., dissenting).
Or note how Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu was seen in Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944). CompareJustice Black's description of the unnamed "petitioner," id
at 215, with the person who was the focus of Justice Jackson's dissent, see id. at 243
(Jackson, J., dissenting) ("Korematsu, however, has been convicted of an act not
commonly a crime. It consists merely of being present in the state whereof he is a citi-
zen, near the place where he was born, and where all his life he has lived.").
Or consider Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). In fairness to
ChiefJustice Taney, Dred Scott and his wife, Harriet, and daughters, Eliza and Lizzie,
were to him not abstractions, but rather "articles of merchandise," id. at 411, who
could no more be citizens of Missouri than tables and chairs could be, see id. at 454.
To be sure, the shameful results in these three cases coincided with the then-
prevailing direction of the political winds, but the presence of forceful dissents in all
three demonstrates what happens when federal judges recognize that the buffer of
Article III permits them to perceive faces in ajudicial calm.
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beauty or of goodness"33--a view that Professor Burbank has, in his
elegantly savage, Burbankian way, recently associated with Judge Jack
Weinstein.m
What I mean to add to our difficult craft is the constant recogni-
tion that, although we without doubt engage in an intellectually re-
spectable discipline, there is always a face or faces before us in every
controversy we decide. Those faces look to us in the passion they suf-
fer in the dramas of their cases.
The judicial enterprise I have in mind is really no more than what
the Framers contemplated when they created a Constitution whose
third Article requires real "Cases" and "Controversies" before "the ju-
dicial Power of the United States" can be applied.35  The Framers
therefore did not entrust us to consider abstractions, but rather to
decide disputes with flesh-and-blood consequences.36
And speaking of the Framers, consider in this context what one of
the most important of them wrote to the people of New York on Feb-
ruary 6, 1788, about the object of the Framers' labor that previous
." BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OFTHEJUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921). Even
the rationalist Cardozo could not resist the tug of Mount Olympus and its supposed
inhabitants when he wrote the introductory essay in Frankfurter's collection, which
begins with an epigraph from Euripides and later reports that Holmes "gives us
glimpses of the things eternal." Benjamin N. Cardozo, Introduction to MR. JUSTICE
HOLMES, supra note 21, at 1, 1-2.
See Stephen B. Burbank, The Courtroom as Classroom: Independence, Imagination
and Ideology in the Work ofJack Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1971 (1997) (arguing that
Judge Weinstein's judicial career is best understood as heavily influenced by his expe-
rience as a law professor, an experience that yields a strong individualism and an ac-
companying lack of regard for institutional accountability).
35 U.S. CONsT. art. III, §. 2, cl. 1.
36 The delegates to the Federal Convention in 1787 consistently "defeated a variety
of proposals to give non-judicial functions" to the court(s) to be created under Article
III. PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 7 (3d ed. 1988). For example, the Convention rejected Charles
Pinckney's proposal that "[e]ach branch of the Legislature, as well as the Supreme Ex-
ecutive shall have authority to require the opinions of the supreme Judicial Court
upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions." 2 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 341 (Max Farrand ed., 1911); see also 3 THE
CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 1763-1826, at 488-89 (Henry P.
Johnston ed., De Capo Press 1971) (1890) (noting that on July 20, 1793, the Justices
advised President Washington that his inquiry of two days earlier appeared "to us to be
of much difficulty as well as importance," and then on August 8, 1793, informed him
that the "strong arguments against the propriety of our extra-judicially deciding the
questions" persuaded them not to do so); 10 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON
542-45 (Jared Sparks ed., Boston, Russell, Shattuck, & Williams 1836) (presenting 29
questions from President Washington that theJustices declined to answer).
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summer in Philadelphia. 'Justice is the end of government," James
Madison wrote in Federalist No. 51. "It is the end of civil society."7
That end is, I submit, for us something richer than Holmes's flip-
pant, "My job is to play the game according to the rules."' s That end
is something more than the judicial analogue of solving crossword
puzzles or making pass-interference calls. That end is the achieve-
ment we win when we apply our mental faculties to their fullest in the
passionate service of all those faces who look to us in our courtrooms.
We owe them, and our institution, no less.
37 THE FEDERALIsT NO. 51, at 324 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Holmes reportedly tossed this response back to the young Learned Hand when
Hand parted from his idol and provoked him with the words "Do justice!" Learned
Hand, A Personal Confession, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 302, 306-07 (Irving Dilliard ed.,
3d ed. 1960). For a rich and exhaustive analysis of the uses and abuses of this oft-
repeated and resonant story, see Michael Herz, "DoJustice!: Variations of a Thrice-Told
Tale 82 VA. L. REV. 111 (1996) (demonstrating how retellers alter the story to suit
their purposes, and offering an appendix section laying out over 40 versions of the
story).
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